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Give step-by-step solution with explanation and final answer: Laughlin and Sons is a company that provides estate planning services to 100 wealthy clients. Although the clients have different wealth levels, their demand for the hourly estate planning services are identical. The aggregate annual demand for estate planning services facing Laughlin and Sons is Q=20000-200P where Q is the total hours of estate planning services and P is the hourly rate charged for the services, and the firm's total cost of providing the estate planning servies is TC=80Q. The firm wants to establish a two-part tariff scheme for charging the clients, and the fees include an annual fixed retainer (entry fee) plus an hourly rae (usage fee). (a) What is the firm's MC of providing estate planning services? WHat is the demand curve for a representative client? (b) what are the profit maximizing levels for the retainer and hourly rate?What is the firm's aggregate annual profit under the two-part tariff scheme? (c) Suppose Laughlin and Sons has a local monopoly on estate plannind services. WHat are the profit maximizing hourly rate (price) and the quantity under a single price monopoly? How does the profit earned under single price monopoly compare to the profit earned in the two part tariff?

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Give step-by-step solution with explanation and final answer: Laughlin and Sons is a company that provides estate planning services to 100 wealthy clients. Although the clients have different wealth levels, their demand for the hourly estate planning services are identical. The aggregate annual demand for estate planning services facing Laughlin and Sons is Q=20000-200P where Q is the total hours of estate planning services and P is the hourly rate charged for the services, and the firm's total cost of providing the estate planning servies is TC=80Q. The firm wants to establish a two-part tariff scheme for charging the clients, and the fees include an annual fixed retainer (entry fee) plus an hourly rae (usage fee). (a) What is the firm's MC of providing estate planning services? WHat is the demand curve for a representative client? (b) what are the profit maximizing levels for the retainer and hourly rate?What is the firm's aggregate annual profit under the two-part tariff scheme? (c) Suppose Laughlin and Sons has a local monopoly on estate plannind services. WHat are the profit maximizing hourly rate (price) and the quantity under a single price monopoly? How does the profit earned under single price monopoly compare to the profit earned in the two part tariff?

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Asked by: mayank
Created at: 2025-09-07 17:30:19

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Let's go step by step through the given problem: **Given:** - Aggregate demand: \( Q = 20,000 - 200P \) (where \( Q \) = total annual hours, \( P \) = price per hour) - 100 identical clients - Total cost: \( TC = 80Q \) (so cost per hour is $80) - Two-part tariff: annual retainer (entry fee) + hourly usage charge --- ## (a) What is the firm's MC? What is the demand curve for a representative client? ### **Marginal Cost (MC):** Given \( TC = 80Q \), so \[ MC = \frac{dTC}{dQ} = 80 \] So, **MC = $80 per hour**. --- ### **Demand Curve for a Representative Client:** Aggregate demand: \( Q = 20,000 - 200P \) There are 100 clients, so the demand per client is: \[ q = \frac{Q}{100} = \frac{20,000 - 200P}{100} = 200 - 2P \] So, for a representative client: \[ q = 200 - 2P \implies P = 100 - 0.5q \] --- ## (b) What are the profit maximizing retainer and hourly rate under a two-part tariff? What is the aggregate annual profit? **Two-part tariff:** The firm sets: - usage price per hour (\( p \)) - entry fee (\( T \)), annual retainer ### **Step 1: Set usage rate at MC** To maximize profit in a two-part tariff with identical customers, set usage price at MC: \[ p = MC = \$80 \] ### **Step 2: Find each client's yearly usage at \( p = 80 \):** From the individual demand: \[ q = 200 - 2p \\ q = 200 - 2(80) = 200 - 160 = 40 \] So, **each client will purchase 40 hours per year**. ### **Step 3: Find consumer surplus per client at \( p = 80 \):** Consumer surplus (CS) is the area under the demand curve above price, up to quantity purchased. - Choke price (where \( q = 0 \)): \( p = 100 \) - At \( p = 80 \), \( q = 40 \) So, CS per client: \[ CS = \frac{1}{2} \times (100 - 80) \times 40 = \frac{1}{2} \times 20 \times 40 = 400 \] ### **Step 4: Set entry fee (retainer) equal to CS** To extract all surplus, set entry fee \( T = \$400 \) per client. --- ### **Firm's profit:** - Each client pays: \( 40 \times 80 = \$3,200 \) in usage fees + \$400 retainer - Cost per client: \( 40 \times 80 = \$3,200 \) - Profit per client: retainer (\$400) - Number of clients: 100 \[ \text{Total profit} = 100 \times 400 = \$40,000 \] --- ## (c) Single-price monopoly: What is the profit-maximizing price, quantity, and profit? Compare to two-part tariff. ### **Step 1: Find MR and set MR = MC** Aggregate demand: \( Q = 20,000 - 200P \implies P = 100 - 0.005Q \) Total revenue: \( TR = P \cdot Q = (100 - 0.005Q)Q = 100Q - 0.005Q^2 \) Marginal revenue: \[ MR = \frac{dTR}{dQ} = 100 - 0.01Q \] Set \( MR = MC \): \[ 100 - 0.01Q = 80 \implies 0.01Q = 20 \implies Q = 2,000 \] ### **Step 2: Find monopoly price** Plug \( Q = 2,000 \) into demand: \[ P = 100 - 0.005 \times 2,000 = 100 - 10 = 90 \] ### **Step 3: Monopoly profit** - Total revenue: \( TR = P \times Q = 90 \times 2,000 = \$180,000 \) - Total cost: \( TC = 80 \times 2,000 = \$160,000 \) - Profit: \( 180,000 - 160,000 = \$20,000 \) ### **Step 4: Comparison** - **Two-part tariff profit:** \$40,000 - **Single-price monopoly profit:** \$20,000 The two-part tariff yields **twice the profit** of a single-price monopoly, because it extracts all consumer surplus as profit. --- ## **Summary Table** | Scheme | Usage Fee | Entry Fee | Q per year | Total Profit | |----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------------| | Two-part tariff | \$80 | \$400 | 4,000 | \$40,000 | | Single-price monopoly| \$90 | \$0 | 2,000 | \$20,000 | - In two-part tariff, all 100 clients participate, each uses 40 hours (\( Q = 4,000 \)). - In monopoly, all 100 clients **still participate** (since demand is aggregate), but total usage is 2,000 hours (\( 20 \) hours/client on average). --- ## **Final Answers** ### (a) - The firm's **marginal cost (MC)** is \$80 per hour. - The demand curve for a representative client is \( q = 200 - 2p \) or \( p = 100 - 0.5q \). ### (b) - **Profit-maximizing hourly rate (usage fee)**: \$80 per hour. - **Profit-maximizing retainer (entry fee)**: \$400 per client per year. - **Aggregate annual profit**: \$40,000. ### (c) - **Monopoly price**: \$90 per hour - **Monopoly quantity**: 2,000 hours/year (or 20 hours/client) - **Monopoly profit**: \$20,000 - **Comparison**: The two-part tariff yields more profit (\$40,000) than the single-price monopoly (\$20,000).

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